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PUBLIC POLICY AND THE "RIGHT"
TO INCORPORATE
INTRODUCTION
General incorporation statutes which authorize incorporation
for any lawful business purpose are in effect in all American juris-
dictions except Oklahoma.' Most jurisdictions distinguish between
the business corporation and the non-profit corporation, many hav-
ing non-profit corporation statutes in addition to "business corpora-
tion" or "stock corporation" statutes. 2 Other jurisdictions, however,
have "general corporation" acts or laws, under which provision is
made for incorporation of non-profit as well as business corpora-
tions. 3
The Model Business Corporation Act, prepared by the Com-
mittee on 'Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association, pro-
vides: "Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful
purpose or purposes, except for the purpose of banking or insur-
ance."" Nineteen jurisdictions adhere to some version of the Act. 5
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, published by the American
Bar Association (ABA) as a companion to the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, also allows corporations to be organized "for any
lawful purpose or purposes." 6 Non-profit corporation statutes based
1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, ¶ 2, at 58 (1971). Oklahoma constitutionally
prohibits incorporation for purposes of dealing in real estate. Okla. Const. art. XXII, § 2. See
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1.9. Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, among others, permit the corporate charter to specify simply that
the corporation will engage in "any lawful activity." 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, ¶ 2,
at 58 (1971). In 1969, the requirement of former § 48(c) of the Model Business Corporation
Act that the articles specify the purposes of the corporation was amended; that section (now
§ 54) of the Model Act now permits an "all purpose" provision in the articles of incorporation.
ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 54(c) (1969). In some jurisdictions, however, the charter
must state with varying degrees of specificity the nature of the business for which the
corporation is organized. 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, 11 2, at 58 (1971).
2 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, ¶ 2, at 58 (1971); H. Henn, Handbook of the Law
of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 3 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as H.
Henn). The Model Business Corporation Act, for example, applies to all corporations for
profit, except those with banking or insurance purposes. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act
§§ 2(a), (h), 3 (1969). Because of its definitions of "corporation," "domestic corporation," and
"foreign corporation" as corporations "for profit," the Model Act excludes non-profit corpora-
tions from its ambit. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 2(a)-(b) (1969). The Model
Non-Profit Corporation Act, on the other hand, applies to "a corporation no part of the
income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or officers." ABA-ALT
Model Non-Profit Corp. Act § 2(c) (1964).
3 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 101(b) (1974) (". .. to conduct or promote any lawful
business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the constitution or other law of
this State." Id.).
4 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp, Act § 3 (1969).
5 H. Henn, supra note 2, at 6. The jurisdictions are: Wisconsin, Oregon, the District of
Columbia, Texas, Virginia, North Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Wyoming, Utah, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Washington, New Mexico, Montana, Georgia, and Rhode
Island. Id.
6 ABA-ALI Model Non-Profit Corp. Act § 4 (1964).
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in whole or in part on the Model Act have been enacted in twenty-
one jurisdictions; 7
 two jurisdictions have similar acts, 8
Thus, most, if not all, American jurisdictions permit incorpora-
tion for "any lawful business " or "any lawful purpose or purposes."
Yet, while the state statutes may share this seemingly permissive
language, the scope of the term "lawful" has received variant judi-
cial construction.
The interpretation of the term "lawful" is especially important
with respect to non-profit corporations. 9 When groups of individuals
seek to incorporate to advance relatively unpopular beliefs concern-
ing political, economic, religious, or cultural matters, the interpreta-
tion of "lawful purposes" may become the focal point for the grant
or denial of corporate status. Even though the advocacy of such
beliefs may not be statutorily prohibited or "illegal," it may,
nonetheless, be "unlawful" under the judicial construction of
ful purposes" for incorporation. The critical question is whether
"lawful" encompasses "public policy" considerations. To the extent
that it does, "lawful" purposes may circumscribe the areas of per-
missible corporate advocacy, particularly when the views sought to
be advanced may be deemed to be "repugnant" or "abhorrent."
Recently in State ex rel. Grant v. Brown,i° the majority of the
Supreme Court of Ohio construed the Ohio statute which provided
that "a corporation may be formed for any purpose or purposes for
which natural persons lawfully may associate themselves. " 1 The
Greater Cincinnati Gay Society, Inc., an organization whose stated
purpose was, in part, "Rio promote acceptance of homosexuality as a
valid life style . . . , "12 sought a writ of mandamus to require the
Secretary of State of Ohio to approve, file and record the organiza-
tion's articles of incorporation." The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a
per curiam opinion, denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the
secretary of state was clothed with discretion in determining which
articles to accept. 14 The court also agreed with the secretary of state
' 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, 9 2, at 59 (1971); Kauper & Ellis, Religious
Corporations and the Law, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1500, 1554 & n.306 (1973). The Act was the
basis for at least part of the non-profit corporation statutes in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, the
District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington and Wisconsin. Id.
▪ 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 3, 9 2, at 59 (1971) (Illinois and Missouri).
' It has been noted that in no other nation in the world does the number and scope of
non-profit organizations approach that in the United States. ()leek, Non-Profit Types, Uses,
and Abuses: 1970, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 207, 217 (1970).
10 39 Ohio St 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974). Grant is discussed in Note, 6 U. Toledo L.
Rev. 237 (1974).
" Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1702.03 (1971) (emphasis added).
13
 39 Ohio St. 2d at 	 313 N.E.2d at 849 n.1 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis deleted).
' 3
 313 N.E.2d at 848.
14
 Id. Judge Herbert, with whom Judge Paul W. Brown joined, concurred in the
judgment, but disagreed with the language in the opinion which suggested that "unfettered
discretion reposes in the Secretary of State." 313 N.E.2d at 849 (concurring opinion). Judge
818
PUBLIC POLICY AND "RIGHT" TO INCORPORATE
that the promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style was con-
trary to state public policy.'s The fact that, as a result of the recent
passage of a statute decriminalizing all private sexual activity be-
tween consenting adults, homosexual acts between consenting adults
were no longer statutory offenses in Ohio was not considered dis-
positive. The court stated that there was "still reason for denying
the writ."' 6
While the court in Grant construed the phrase "lawful" to
encompass public policy considerations, as well as legislative and
judicial statements of the law, a much narrower construction of the
phrase "for any lawful purpose" was previously adopted by the
majority of the New York Court of Appeals in Association for the
Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Shapiro." The cer-
tificate of incorporation of the proposed corporation included the
following purposes:
(a) to promote the right to individual freedom of
choice and association, constituting the right of the indi-
vidual to associate with only those persons with whom he
desires to associate; .
(c) to assist in the elimination of barriers to individual
freedom of choice and its exercise in specific instances, as
well as preventing and guarding against deprivation of this
right at large; and
(d) to find and promote the means through freedom of
choice and association by which the numerous groups in
our multicultural society can find their fullest develop-
ment. 18
A justice of the Supreme Court denied approval,' 9 stating that the
duty of the court was not only to see that the requirements of the
incorporation statute had been met, but also to determine whether
the purposes of the proposed corporation are "lawful, in accord with
public policy, and not injurious to the community." 2° On appeal,
Stem entered a dissenting opinion. Id. Judge William 8. Brown concurred in the dissenting
opinion of Judge Stern, stating that the duty of the secretary of state is ministerial—if the
articles are filed in legal form following all legal requirements, he must accept them. Id. at 851
(dissenting opinion).
'' 313 N.E.2d at 848.
16 Id.
17 9 N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961) (hereinafter cited as
Freedom of Choice).
IS
 Id. at 380, 174 N.E.2d at 488, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
• 19 In re Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 1013,
187 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (Sup. Ct. 1959). At the time in question § 10 of the New York
Membership Corporation Law (superseded in 1970 by the New York Not-For-Profit Corpora-
tion Law (McKinney 1970)) provided, in pertinent part: "Every certificate of incorporation
filed under this chapter shall have endorsed thereon or annexed thereto the approval of a
justice of the supreme court of the judicial district in which the office of the corporation is to
be located." [1960] Laws of N.Y. ch. 985, I.
2° In re Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 1013,
187 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (Sup, Ct. 1959).
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the New York Court of Appeals rejected previous lower court
decisions which in its view had "enlarged this comparatively simple
and narrow judicial function [to ascertain whether the proposed
corporation was for a lawful purpose] and [had] engrafted thereon
the requirement 'of a finding that the objects and purposes of the
proposed corporation are in accord with public policy . . . and not
injurious to the community . . . " 21 The court then concluded that
state public policy is not violated by purposes which are not unlaw-
ful, and that approval of articles of incorporation cannot be denied
on the basis of "vague, indefinite and elusive" standards as to what
might be injurious to the community. 22
Various reasons have been advanced in support of a broad
construction of "lawful purposes," encompassing extra-statutory
"public policy" considerations. Incorporation has been viewed as a
privilege which the state can withhold from organizations whose
objectives are a "contradiction" of state law. 23
 Therefore, it has
been contended that a "lawful" purpose must be in conformity with
both the "letter" and "spirit" of the law, 24
 and that in order for the
purposes of a proposed corporation to be "lawful" they must not
only be legal but must also be in accord "with an explicitly defined
public policy of a State." 25
 Finally, it has been emphasized that
freedom of association is not tantamount to a right to incorporate, 26
and that there are purposes for which individuals are free to associ-
ate and express their views, but not as a corporation. 27
The narrow construction of "lawful purposes," whereby public
policy is not violated by purposes which are not unlawful, in effect
2 ' Freedom of Choice, 9 N.Y.2d at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391, citing
In re Daughters of Israel Orphan Aid Soc'y, 125 Misc. 217, 219, 210 N.Y.S. 541, 543 (Sup.
Ct. 1925). See also In re Stillwell Political Club, Inc., 26 Misc. 2d 931, 932, 109 N.Y.S.2d
331, 333 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Lewis v. Harlem Dental Co., 189 App. Div. 359, 362, 178 N.Y.S.
533, 536 (1919).
22
 9 N.Y.2d at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Judge Burke dissented. Id.
at 383, 174 N.E.2d at 490, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (dissenting opinion). Judge Froessel con-
curred in Judge Burke's opinion. Id. at 386, 174 N.E.2d at 491, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 394
(dissenting opinion).
23
 Id. at 384, 385, 174 N.E.2d at 490, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 392, 393 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Judge Burke emphasized that the organizers of the proposed corporation were seeking to:
[Olbtain "the imprimatur of incorporation", bearing the blessing of the Supreme
Court, the benediction of the Secretary of State, and the rights to affix the charac-
terization "Incorporated under the Laws of the State of New York" to public matter
so as to enable the organizers to assure themselves the prestige which accompanies
the privilege . .
Id. at 384, 174 N.E.2d at 490, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 384, 174 N.E.2d at 490, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (dissenting opinion). •
23 Id.
26
 Id. at 385-86, 174 N.E.2d at 491, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (dissenting opinion).
27
 Id. See also In re Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 18 Misc. 2d
534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1959) where, in denying a petition for a rehearing, the
justice of the Supreme Court concluded that although the sponsors of the proposed corpora-
tion were free to associate for the purposes set forth in their proposed certificate of incorpora-
tion, they could not "compel the State to grant them for these purposes, the benefits and
privileges of incorporation as a membership corporation." Id. at 535, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
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construes "lawful" to mean only that an activity is "authorized,
sanctioned, or at any rate not forbidden by law." 2 s Under this
construction, the statutory requirement of a "lawful" purpose is met
if the articles of incorporation state a purpose "not contrary to
general statutes."29 This view is intended to limit the amount of
discretion to be excerised by an official, such as a judge or the
secretary of state, in dealing with proposed articles of incorporation,
thereby preventing the official from becoming the spokesman or
interpreter of the state's public policy. 3° It is further emphasized
that fundamental concepts such as freedom of association and free-
dom of expression are involved 3 I which should not be subjected to
an official's unguided discretion. 32 Finally, under the narrow con-
struction of "lawful" it has been noted that approval of a corporate
charter does not imply state approval of the views of its sponsors
and that dissenting organizations are entitled to freedom of expres-
sion and to an equal, objective application of the statute. 33
Grant and Freedom of Choice suggest the issues raised by the
use of broad, "extra-statutory" public policy considerations such as
those adopted by the majority in Grant in determining whether the
purposes or objects of a proposed corporation are "lawful." Initially,
this comment will focus on the question of the proper interpretation
of "lawful" as a matter of statutory construction. Although the
constitutionality of the kind of construction of "lawful purposes"
adopted by the majority in Grant has never been directly tested,
statutes which might be construed as allowing judicial or adminis-
trative officers to subjectively evaluate the lawfulness of a non-profit
organization's proposed purposes have received strong criticism. 34
The constitutional questions raised by the introduction of "extra-
statutory" public policy considerations will therefore be examined.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The determination of the proper construction of the term "law-
ful" as it appears in corporation statutes requires resort to standard
rules of statutory interpretation. First among the pertinent rules is
the principle that statutes are to be given their plain meaning." The
2!
 Grant, 313 N.E.2d at 850 (Stern, J., dissenting).
29
 Id.
3 ° Id.
31 Freedom of Choice, 9 N.Y.2d at.382-83, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
32 Id. at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
33 Id. at 383, 174 N.E.2d at 490, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
34 See Dwight, Objections to Judicial Approval of Charters of Non-Profit Corporations,
12 Bus. Law. 454 (1957). See also McAulay & Brewster, In re Application of the Association
for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, 6 flow. L.J. 169 (1960); Note, 6 U. Toledo L.
Rev. 237 (1974); Comment, 66 Yale L.J. 545, 550-55 (1957); Note, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 380,
394-95 (1955).
35 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940):
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than
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dissenting judges in both Grant and Freedom of Choice referring to
dictionary definitions, came to opposite conclusions as to the proper
interpretation of "lawful." 36 Thus,.it would seem that application of
public policy considerations in determining the lawfulness of a
proposed corporate purpose does not necessarily follow from the
plain meaning of the term. Furthermore, it is submitted that the
rule of statutory construction that legislative history is relevant to a
determination of the proper meaning of statutory language, particu-
larly where the statutory language is not clear, 37 leads to the con-
clusion that the phrase "lawful purpose" should be construed nar-
rowly.
Control over corporate formation has traditionally rested in the
state legislative departments. 38 Originally, corporate capacity could
only be attained by special legislative charter. Partly because of the
gross favoritism inherent in such a system, general incorporation
statutes were passed in all states. 39 Yet, the potential for favoritism,
or discrimination and arbitrariness, is inherent in a system whereby
a state official is given discretion to determine that particular corpo-
rate purposes,. while not contrary to any specific statute, are
nonetheless against "extra-statutory" public policy.
Even if the official who is granted such broad discretion at-
tempts to apply the broad "extra-statutory" standard on an even-
handed basis, no guidelines are, or in reality can be, given for its
application. It would seem that if the state legislature determined
that certain purposes should not be undertaken in a corporate form,
it could designate them specifically rather than vesting broad discre-
tion in a single administrative official to fashion the state's public
policy on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach would appear
logically consistent with the basic role of the legislator, since he is
commonly charged with considerations of "public policy." Thus, it
would seem that the narrow construction of lawful purposes ap-
plied in Freedom of Choice is consistent with the purposes under-
lying the adoption of general incorporation statutes. The broad
the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often
these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the
legislature. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
Id. at 543.
36 Compare Grant, 313 N.E.2d at 850 (Stern, J., dissenting) (lawful purpose is one "not
contrary to general statutes") with Freedom of Choice, 9 N.Y.2d at 384, 174 N.E.2d at 492,
214 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (Froessel, J., dissenting) (lawful purpose is one which is in conformity
with "not only the letter, but also the spirit of the law").
37 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940): "When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can
be no 'rule of law' which forbids the use, however clear the words may appear on 'super-
ficial examination.' " Id. at 543-44.
3g See, e.g., Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 127-28 (1937); Ashley v.
Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 441 (1894).
39
 Kauper & Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1500, 1509 &
n.40. (1972).
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interpretation of "lawful purpose" as encompassing "extra-statutory"
public policy considerations adopted in Grant would, on the other
hand, appear to encourage the favoritism, discrimination, and arbi-
trariness which the states intended to eliminate through the passage
of general incorporation statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF STATE POWER
OVER INCORPORATION—IN GENERAL
In analyzing the constitutionality of the denial of incorporation
on the basis of broad "extra-statutory" public policy considerations,
it should be emphasized that the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly held that there is no natural or fundamental right to
conduct business in the form of a corporation. 4° Incorporation is a
privilege within the authority of the sovereign states. 4 ' Moreover,
state control clearly reaches the purposes for which a corporation
may be formed. 42
State authority over corporations and their formation is not,
however, without limitation. A state may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of a constitutional right or which
conflict with the Constitution. 43 Thus, for example, in the area of
state power over the conditions under which foreign corporations
may do business within the state, the Supreme Court has held void
provisions revoking the license of a foreign corporation for exercis-
ing its constitutional right to remove suits brought against it from
the state courts to the federal courts," provisions subjecting a
foreign corporation to payment of a tax not only on its property
within the state, but also on its property outside of the state in
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 45
40 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922).
4 ' "That the right to be a state corporation depends solely upon the grace of the State,
and is not a right inherent in the parties is settled." Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 441 (1894).
See also Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1937); Martinez v. Asociacion
de Senoras, 213 U.S. 20, 25 (1909); Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228 (1891).
42 "(The state prescribes the purposes of a corporation and the means of executing those
purposes. Purposes and means are within the State's control." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 43 (1900). See also New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63,
72 (1928) (state may adopt reasonable regulations to confine purposes within limits "consistent
with the rights of others and the public welfare"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530,
536 (1922) (state may impose conditions and duties reasonably necessary to prevent corporate
activities from operating "to the detriment of the rights of others with whom it may come in
contact"); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 313 (1892) (state may impose
conditions "most suitable to the public interests and policy").
43
 See, e.g., Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 (1941); Hanover Fire
Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
445, 456 (1874).
" E.g., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922).
45
 E.g., St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 48 (1910).
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and, provisions of a tax or license law which operate to deny to a
foreign corporation the equal protection of laws. 46
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The power of a state in dealing with corporations has also been
recognized as subject to the right to freedom of association. In
NAACP v. Alabama,'" the  Court emphasized that "freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech."48
 In holding that the state of Alabama could not compel
disclosure of the membership lists of a foreign corporation as a
condition of qualifying to do business in the state, 49 the Court noted
that state action which might curtail freedom to associate is subject
to the closest scrutiny." Furthermore, it is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced concern political, economic, religious
or cultural matters or whether the state's action is unintended,
rather than direct. 5 I
Therefore, while it is clear that there is no "right" to incorpo-
rate, it is also clear that a state may not exercise its power over the
privilege in such a manner as to violate the constitutional right to
associate. In a situation involving both a state-controlled privilege
and freedom of association, the Court in Healy v. James 52 dealt
with the denial by a state college of official recognition to a group of
students who desired to form a local chapter of a radical political
organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The presi-
dent of the school refused recognition, in part, because the organiza-
tion's goals were "antithetical to the school's policies . "53 The
Court noted that nonrecognition barred the group from using cam-
pus facilities for holding meetings," and denied them access to the
school newspaper and campus bulletin boards, ". . . the customary
media for communicating with the administration, faculty members,
and other students." 55 Reasoning that the denial of official recogni-
tion was a form of prior restraint of the associational activities of the
students, the Court concluded that once an application which con-
formed to existing requirements was filed, the college was under a
46 E.g., Air Way Elec. Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 85 (1924); Southern Ry. v.
Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910).
47 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
46 Id. at 460.
46 Id. at 466.-
5° Id. at 460-61.
" Id.
52 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
53 Id. at 174-75.
54 Id. at 176.
55 Id. at 181-82.
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"heavy burden" to justify its decision of rejection. 56 Disagreement
with a group's philosophy, or finding its views repugnant, stated the
Court, is insufficient reason to deny First Amendment rights. 57 The
state "may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds
the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent."58
It is submitted that the decision in Healy v. James is relevant to
the analysis of the constitutionality of a denial of incorporation on
broad, "extra-statutory" public policy grounds. The state college in
Healy took the position that all the proposed organization was
denied was a "stamp' of approval," and that the students involved
could still meet informally on campus, as individuals if not as a
recognized organization, and, in any event, could meet as a group
off campus." The Court held, however, that denial of the use of
campus facilities hindered the ability of the organization to com-
municate in a campus environment, and could hardly be viewed as
an "insubstantial" impediment. 6°
In the context of denial of incorporation for "extra-statutory"
public policy reasons, it has been similarly emphasized that, despite
the denial of the "imprimatur of incorporation,"" the individuals
involved are nonetheless free to associate and express their views,
though not as a corporation. 62 The Court in Healy specifically
rejected such reasoning where the denial of official recognition by
the state results in a substantial impediment of the ability of an
organization to communicate and the ability of its individual mem-
bers to associate." The question then becomes whether denial of
incorporation for "extra-statutory" public policy reasons results in a
similar 'substantial impediment of the right to associate.
Arguably, both NAACP v. Alabama and Healy involved more
substantial burdens on the right to associate than does denial of
corporate status to an organization. In NAACP, the foreign corpora-
tion could not function in Alabama without furnishing its member-
ship lists and qualifying to do business in the state. In Healy,
56 Id. at 184. The Court recognized that legitimate interests might exist to justify such
restraint; the state, however, bears the burden of demonstrating them. Id.
57
 Id. at 187.
58 Id. at 187-88.
59
 Id. at 182-83.
60 Id. at 181-82.
61 See note 23 supra.
62 See text at note 27 supra.
65 408 U.S. at 182. The court in Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1974), which held that a university's ban on the social functions of an officially recognized
student homosexual organization violated the First Amendment, 509 F.2d at 662, has said:
[T]he [Healy Court] focused not on the technical point of recognition or non recogni-
tion, but on the practicalities of human interaction. . . . The ultimate issue at which
inquiry must be directed is the effect which a regulation has on organizational and
associations' activities, not the isolated and for the most part irrelevant issue of
recognition per se.
509 F.2d at 658-59. '
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non-recognized campus organizations were excluded from all use of
campus facilities and were denied access to the customary media for
communicating in a campus environment. Admittedly, the privilege
of incorporation is not crucial to freedom of association; 64 individu-
als who are denied corporate status are free to function as an
unincorporated association. Yet, neither NAACP nor Healy required
absolute deprivation of the right to associate as a prerequisite to
invalidation of the state action. The Court in NAACP spoke of
"restraint" and "deterrent effect" on freedom of association, 65 and
the Court in Healy recognized that denial of recognition as a campus
organization was a not "insubstantial" impediment, which resulted
in "disabilities" on the individuals attempting to exercise their right
of association. 66
Thus, it may be contended that the burden on associational
rights which results from denial of the corporate privilege, while
possibly not as great as the burdens which the Court recognized in
NAACP and Healy, is nonetheless sufficiently substantial to warrant
constitutional protection. Significant disadvantages or disabilities
may result from a denial of incorporation. For example, it has been
suggested that the imprimatur of incorporation may vest an organi-
zation with a "badge of legality" which, although of minimal impor-
tance to large, established organizations, may be of extreme impor-
tance to organizations seeking to advance relatively unpopular
views. 67 Furthermore, denial of incorporation may place an organi-
zation at a serious disadvantage in competing with incorporated
associations." In this regard, it has been noted that fear of unlim-
ited personal liability, however, groundless, may prevent persons
from becoming members of unincorporated associations. 69 Finally,
the inability to sue or hold property may financially disadvantage an
unincorporated organization." Thus, to some extent, corporate
status may encourage both membership in, and acceptance of, a
non-profit organization and may provide financial alternatives more
amenable to the accumulation of the resources necessary to attain
widespread publication of the views the organization seeks to advo-
cate. In sum, it may be contended that the denial of the corporate
status imposes significant disadvantages on an organization so as to
deter substantially the First Amendment right to associate.
64
 McAulay & Brewster, supra note 34, at 169.
" .357 U.S. at 462, 463, 466.
" 408 U.S. at 182, 183.
69
 McAulay & Brewster, supra nate 34, at 169-70.
" Comment, 66 Yale L.J. 545, 552-54 (1957).
• 69 Id. at 553. The author recognized that although statutes have not conferred limited
liability on members of unincorporated associations, the common law requirement that a
creditor prove that the member sought to be held liable had authorized the debt-producing act
has, in effect, achieved that same result. Id. at 551 n.36. Nevertheless, the author concludes
that unincorporated association is so identified with unlimited liability that non-profit corpora-
tions with limited liability obtain an advantage in acquiring additional membership. Id. at
553 n.48.
79 Id. at 553-54.
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Furthermore, it is submitted that even if, assuming arguendo,
the burdens imposed by denial of incorporation are less substantial
than those previously held invalid by the Court, the First Amend-
ment freedom of association should prevent arbitrary denial of in-
corporation under a broad "extra-statutory" public policy standard
such as that adopted by the majority in Grant. Even if denial of the
privilege of incorporation does not constitute a substantial burden
on the activities of an organization, it may nonetheless operate as a
punishment based on the views sought to be expounded by the
organization. The corporation is unquestionably a form of associa-
tion, and an organization which deems it desirable to pursue its
associational activities in that form should not be prevented from
doing so on the basis of the views it seeks to advocate. Having
recognized that a state cannot "restrict speech or association simply
because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhor-
rent,"7 ' it would seem logically inconsistent for the Court to limit
recognition of the First Amendment freedom of association to "sub-
stantial" restrictions. Lesser restrictions on the right to associate, it
is submitted, should also be justified by a controlling state interest.
In both NAACP and Healy, the Court utilized a balancing test
in assessing the validity of state restriction of associational rights.
Under NAACP a showing of controlling state justification for the
deterrent effect on the right to associate will establish the validity of
the state action, 72 while under Healy the state action will be sus-
tained if the state satisfies its " 'heavy burden' ... to demonstrate
the appropriateness of [itsi action."'" Rather than simply allowing
the state to impose less substantial restrictions on the right of associ-
ation, it would seem appropriate to assess the validity of less sig-
nificant restrictions on freedom of association through application of
the balancing test, by requiring a lesser countervailing state interest
to justify a less substantial infringement or restriction on associa-
tional rights. In this manner, freedom of association would not be
subject to arbitrary restrictions, be they very substantial or only
moderately so; at the same time, legitimate state interests would still
justify appropriate restriction on an individual's freedom of associa-
tion.
If the right to associate is extended to reach less substantial
state restrictions, the legitimacy of a state's denial of incorporation
for "public policy" reasons would depend on the interest which the
state sought to advance by the denial. The reasons which justify
statutory restrictions on the rights of an individual would justify
denial of incorporation on a limited, "statutory" public policy
basis—the state has the requisite controlling interest in preventing
the incorporation of a group of individuals to achieve purposes
which are expressly prohibited by statute and which they could not
71 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88(1972).
72 357 U.S. at 466.
73 408 U.S. at 184.
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pursue as individuals. 74 A broad, "extra-statutory" standard such as
that adopted by the majority in Grant is not, however, limited to the
express statutory prohibitions of the state. 75 The state can, under
such a standard, deny the "privilege" of incorporation for purposes
which the individuals would be free to pursue either as individuals
or as unincorporated organizations. 76
 Yet, by recognizing that indi-
viduals or organizations are free to pursue such activities, except in a
corporate form, the state has, it is submitted, implicity negated any
interest whatsoever in denial of incorporation for "extra-statutory"
reasons, since the denial results in neither regulation nor absolute
prevention of the activity proposed by the would-be corporation."
The restriction on freedom of association resulting from a
state's denial of incorporation based solely on "extra-statutory" pub-
lic policy grounds, rather than the express statutory law of the state,
would seem to further no apparent state interest. Therefore, even
assuming that corporate status is of questionable significance in
furthering the associational interests of the members of an organiza-
tion, that interest, however minimal, would be sufficient to invali-
date the extra-statutory restriction.
PRIOR RESTRAINT
In addition to its finding of an insufficent state interest to justify
the resulting deterrent effect on the students' associational activities,
the Court in Healy noted that the system which vested authority in
the state college's president to deny official recognition operated as a
prior restraint on those associational activities. 78 Similarly, assum-
ing a sufficient nexus between incorporation and the First Amend-
ment rights of association and expression, it is submitted that a
system whereby a secretary of state or a judge may deny incorpora-
tion under a statute authorizing incorporation for "lawful purposes"
on the basis of "extra-statutory" public policy grounds operates as a
prior restraint. 79
• There is a "heavy presumption" against the constitutionality of
prior restraint on expression. 8° While the protection as to prior or
74 See text at notes 28-29 supra.
75 See text at notes 14-16, 23-25 supra.
76 See text at note 27 supra.
77 "Since refusal of a charter need not prevent the applicants from undertaking the
contemplated activities as individuals or as an unincorporated association, it would not
appear that denial of incorporation is an effective means of prevention or regulation." Note,
55 Colum. L.J. 380, 395 (1955).
78 408 U.S. at 184. See text at note 56 supra.
79 In most jurisdictions, the articles of incorporation are filed with the secretary of state,
who makes the determination as to lawfulness. H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises 221 (2d ed. 1970). If the articles are found to contain
unlawful provisions, the secretary is under a duty to reject them. Id. at 222 n.17. In some
jurisdictions, a court order (e.g., Alabama, Georgia) or approval of the state attorney general•
(e.g., Maine, New Hampshire) is required. Id. at 222 & nn.9 & 10.
8° Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (state court's
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previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited," limitations have
been recognized only in exceptional cases. 82 In numerous decisions,
the Supreme Court has held that a law subjecting the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, with-
out "narrow, objective, and definite standards" to guide the licens-
ing authority is unconstitutional." While it is clear that the statu-
tory "lawful purpose" requirements are not unconstitutional on their
face, it is submitted that such provisions may be unconstitutional as
applied by the courts. Therefore, the question becomes whether an
"extra-statutory" public policy standard for the denial of incorpora-
tion is sufficiently objective to allow the resultant prior restraint on
the First Amendment right to associate.
An analysis of specific standards which the Court has held
unconstitutionally vague, broad, or indefinite is enlightening. An
ordinance which required an organization seeking to solicit members
who would pay "dues" or "fees" to apply to the mayor and city
council for a permit which they could grant or refuse to grant after
considering "the character of the applicant, the nature of the organi-
zation for which members are desired to be solicited, and its effects
upon the general welfare of [the] citizens"84 has been held an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint in that it granted uncontrolled discretion to
an administrative official." Similarly, an ordinance granting a city
commission power to prohibit a parade, procession, or demonstra-
tion on city streets based on consideration of "public welfare, peace,
safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience" 86 was
held an impermissible prior restraint." Likewise, an ordinance
which permitted the banning of motion picture films on the basis of
a determination by the New York State Board of Regents that it
was "sacrilegious" was held to set "the censor . . adrift upon a
designation of distribution of literature as to the "blockbusting" activities of an individual as
an invasion of privacy held not sufficient to support injunction); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 181 (1968) (failure to give notice, formal or informal, and to provide an opportunity
for an adversary proceeding before the holding of a rally was restrained, held incompatible
with the First Amendment); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (system
of prior administrative restraints by non-judicial body, listing particular publications as
objectionable, held an unconstitutional prior restraint).
°' Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
12 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
"3 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). See, e.g., Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (system allowing unfettered discretion in local officials in
the regulation of use of streets for peaceful parades and meetings held an unwarranted
abridgment of freedom of speech and assembly); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at
504-05 (statute forbidding the showing of any motion picture film without a license and
authorizing denial of a license upon the censor's conclusion that the film is "sacrilegious" held
void as a prior restraint); Niemotko v, Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1951) (lack of
standards in city's practice as to issuance of licenses for the use of city parks to hold public
meetings rendered that practice a prior restraint in contravention of Fourteenth Amendment).
Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 314 n.1 (1958).
" 3 Id. at 325.
'6 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969).
57 Id. at 150-51.
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boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious
views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and
powerful orthodoxies." 88
It should be emphasized that a statute authorizing incorpora-
tion for "lawful purposes" is not invalid on its face—the construc-
tion given an incorporation statute is all-important in determining
the possibility of unconstitutional prior restraint. Even if "lawful
purposes" is construed so as to include a "not against public policy"
standard, it would appear possible to avoid unconstitutional prior
restraint by narrowly construing "public policy" as being limited to
the express statutory prohibitions of the state, rather then encom-
passing "extra-statutory" considerations. Such a "statutory" public
policy standard would appear acceptable—the laws of the state
would provide the "narrow, objective, and definite" standards
necessary to avoid unconstitutional prior restraint on the First
Amendment freedoms of association and expression. 89
An "extra-statutory" public policy standard such as that applied
in Grant is, on the other hand, hardly more definite than standards
such as "sacrilegious" or standards which allow an administrative
official to base his decision on considerations such as the effects on
the "general- welfare" or "good order." Given a holding that an
activity can be against public policy although not contrary to any
particular statute, an official is, in effect, free to develop his own
standards of "public policy" based on his own personal views,
beliefs, or predilections. He is, in reality, a censor, determining
what points of view may be expressed by corporations. Placing such
discretion in the hands of an official invites arbitrariness and prior
restraint as to views inimical to those of the granting official, for
Isjpeech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as
it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech
. . . is . . . protected against censorship or punishment . . . ."90
Given broad discretion, a biased or narrowminded official would, in
effect, be able to promote standardization of both speech and
thought. If incorporation for any "lawful purpose" is given such a
broad "extra-statutory" public policy construction, it is done at the
expense of fundamental constitutional values, and at the risk of
unconstitutional prior restraint. Thus, it is submitted that the lawful
purpose requirement was unconstitutional as applied by the court in
Grant.
88
 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1952).
89 See authorities cited in note 83 supra.
9° Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). It should be noted that the existence of
judicial review of the secretary of state's determination as to which purposes are against
public policy does not obviate the constitutionally questionable prior restraint aspects of the
Ohio incorporation process. "[The availability of a judicial remedy for abuses in the system
. . . still leaves that system one of previous restraint ...." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 306 (1940).
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At least one case supports this analysis. In Smith v. Ladner9 '
the Mississippi statutory procedure for issuing charters to non-profit
corporations, was challenged as vesting unconstitutionally broad
discretion in the governor to grant or deny non-profit corporate
charters. Under the statute, an application for a non-profit charter
was to be submitted to the secretary of state, who in turn would
submit the application to the attorney general. 92
 After making a
finding as to whether the issuance of the proposed charter would be
"contrary to the best interests of the State of Mississippi,"93
 the
attorney general would then submit the application, together with his
opinion, to the governor, who was vested with absolute power to
approve or refuse the proposed charter. 94
The federal district .court, noting that courts have repeatedly
held that any statute conferring such absolute and arbitrary discre-
tion on a state official to grant or deny a privilege is unconstitu-
tiona1, 95
 stated that even if it were argued that the statute in
question limited the governor's disapproval to charters which were
not in the "best interest" of the state, and thus did not grant
absolutely unlimited discretion, that standard was so vague as to be
unconstitutional on its face. 96 The court, therefore, held that when
an application for a non-profit corporation did not violate the con-
stitution or statutes of the state, the charter must be issued, and that
any attempt to allow the rejection of such a charter on the basis that
its issuance would not be in the best interest of the state, without
providing further standards for such a determination, would be
constitutionally invalid. 97
While a statute which limits incorporation to "lawful purposes"
is not void on its face, it is submitted that a construction of "lawful
purposes" such as that adopted in Grant permits unconstitutional
discretion tantamount to that granted by a statute which limits
incorporation to purposes which are determined to be in the "best
interest" of the state. No guidelines are imposed for the application
91
 288 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
92
 See id. at 67, 68 n.1, construing [1942I Miss. Code Ann. § 5310,1,
95 Id.
" [1942] Miss. Code Ann. § 5310.1, quoted in 288 F. Supp. at 67 & 68 n. 1.
95
 288 F. Supp. at 68.
96
 Id. at 69. The court cited with approval the Supreme Court's decision in Staub v.
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1955). See text at notes 83-84 supra. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886):
When we consider the nature and theory of our institutions of government, the.
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room
for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
Id. at 369-70.
92
 288 F. Supp. at 71. Section 5310.1 was repealed, and reenacted in different form, in
1968. [1968] Miss. Laws, ch. 275. The new law provides that the governor must immediately
upon receipt of a charter approve it, unless the attorney general states that, in his opinion, the
proposed corporation violates the constitutions or laws of Mississippi or of the United States,
in which case the application will be rejected. Id. § I.
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of "extra-statutory" public policy considerations. In effect, such a
judicial construction would seem to grant the same absolutely un-
limited discretion which caused the Mississippi statute in Smith v.
Ladner to be held void on its face.
FIRST AMENDMENT RATIONALE
It is further submitted that a construction of "lawful" purpose
as encompassing broad, "extra-statutory" public policy considera-
tions also conflicts with the policies underlying the First Amend-
ment. Association has been recognized as enhancing effective advo-
cacy of both public and private points of view, especially controver-
sial ones. 98 In this regard, it has been appropriately noted:
The conduct of an association is likely to acquire unique
qualities, to have effects which can originate only with an
association rather than an individual. In practice, through
the accumlation of resources, through the focusing of ef-
fort, and through the other results of organization, an
association may be able to achieve objectives so far beyond
individual effort as to be qualitatively different. 99
In analyzing an "extra-statutory" public policy approach to
limitation of incorporation, consideration should be given to the
importance in modern society of the corporate form and the cumula-
tive benefits corporate status may offer to group association. The
importance of the corporation has long been recognized, and it has
been stated that the corporation is now "by far the best and most
popular form of organization for most group enterprises."'°' For
whatever reasons, corporate status has become the most popular
and well recognized form of organization today for both business
and non-business enterprises, and, it is submitted, in the case of an
organization advocating relatively unpopular views, a status in
which members of the public sharing those or similar views might
be willing to associate themselves more readily.'°' To the extent
that widespread acceptance of the corporate status and cognizance
of the corporation's potential power encourages membership, it en-
hances the effective advocacy of that association.
Recognition of the additional power and public acceptance
which corporate status may afford a non-profit organization might
seem to lend support to a view that reference to "extra-statutory"
public policy should be available in situations where it seems likely
that a state interest will be harmed by the more effective advocacy
which may result from corporate status. However, under the
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
9° Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,. 74 Yale L.J. 1, 4
(1964).
le° Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses -. 1970, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 207, 217
(1970).
'°' See text at notes 67-69 supra.
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American system of government, accommodation is made for the
widest varieties of tastes and ideas.'" The possibility of resultant
abuse from unfettered exercise of First Amendment rights is well-
recognized, "[Nut the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democ-
racy."'" Therefore, in spite of this probability of abuse of First
Amendment rights, courts nontheless recognize that not only
abstract discussion, but the most vigorous advocacy, must be pro-
tected. 1 °4
The scope of the First Amendment protection recognizes that,
regardless of this potential for abuse and regardless of the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the views propounded, 1 °5 unfettered
First Amendment rights are necessary for a government reponsive to
the will and needs of its people. Correspondingly, if the corporate
form is conducive to stronger advocacy and an enhanced likelihood
of acceptance of unpopular views, it does not necessarily follow that
incorporation should be denied on the basis of "extra-statutory"
public policy. Though the abuses which may result from the scope
of First Amendment protection may be magnified by the corporate
form, it is suggested that the probability of the achievement of the
important objectives which underlie the First Amendment is also
increased.
EQUAL PROTECTION—DENIAL OF A PRIVILEGE
Moreover, the possible constitutional infirmity of the applica-
tion of an "extra-statutory" public policy standard cannot be
avoided on the basis that, even if a state incorporation statute may
operate as a prior restraint on associational rights, it does so in the
context of the "privilege" of incorporation. Even though a person
may have no "right" to a governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny such a benefit for myriad reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely.'" In
numerous decisions, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that benefits or privileges may not be denied to a person on a
basis that infringes upon First Amendment freedoms. 107
'° 2 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946).
"3 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
104 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
'° See text at note 116 infra. Mr. Justice Black has noted: "I do not believe that it can
be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by
the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be
denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. I, 137 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
I" See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (state college professor's
lack of tenure or a contractual right to re-employment did not, in and of itself, defeat his
claim that the nonrenewal of his contract violated his right to free speech).
107
 The Court has applied this principle to the denial of welfare payments, Graham v.
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The rationale for this rule is both simple and convincing. First,
if the government could deny a benefit on the basis of a person's
constitutionally protected speech or associations, the exercise of
those freedoms would, in effect, be penalized and inhibited. In this
manner, the government could indirectly "produce a result which
[it] could not command directly. P1108 For example, in the Grant
situation it could not be seriously contended that Ohio could prevent
public exposition by an individual of homosexual views, even if
those views advocated the repeal of existing laws. " 9 Nor could it be
successfully maintained that Ohio could prevent the informal as-
sociation of homosexuals to promote homosexuality or for other
purposes not in violation of the laws of Ohio. Yet, in the context of
the "privilege" of incorporation, the Grant court asserts that the
state can prevent the formation of a corporation for the same pur-
poses which an individual could seek to achieve with impunity. The
effect of the court's position in Grant is to maintain that while a
state may not deny a person freedom of speech, it may withhold the
privilege of incorporation, which, it is submitted, may punish the
individual for the content of his speech.
The second reason for the rule that a state may not deny a
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969);
the opportunity for public employment, Pickering v. Board of Educ., .391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); unemployment benefits,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1962); federal social security benefits, Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S, 603, 611 (1960); tax exemptions, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518
(1958); and second-class mail rates, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
'" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 526. See Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), where in holding that a state statute
regulating the privilege of using state highways and requiring private carriers to obtain
permits as common carriers and to submit to regulation as common carriers violated the Due
Process caluse, the Supreme Court stated:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of expressed divestment, seeks to strip the citizens of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.
Id. at 593.
109 Advocacy of the repeal of laws is constitutionally protected speech; however, incite-
ment to imminent lawless action may be proscribed by the state. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969):
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447. "Statutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech,
must observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent
lawless action . . ." Id. at 449 n.4. Moreover, freedom to advocate change in the laws is a
recognized goal of the United States Constitution. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931): "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." Id. at 369.
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"benefit" or "privilege" on the basis of an individual's protected
speech or associations is the belief that "[i]f the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States
may thus be manipulated out of existence."Il° For example, allow-
ing a state to deny the "privilege" of incorporation for "extra-
statutory" public policy reasons would allow the state to draft an
ever-increasing list of unacceptable views."' Just as a state cannot
compel an organization to sacrifice constitutional rights for the
"privilege" of incorporation, it would appear that it should not, in
return for the "privilege" of non-profit corporate status, cir-
cumscribe the areas of permissible corporate advocacy.
The possibility of denial of Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection of the laws inherent in a construction of "lawful" purposes
which permits denial of incorporation on broad "extra-statutory"
public policy grounds should not be disregarded."' The Supreme
Court has stated:
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to
determine which expressions of view will be permitted and
which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination
among persons or groups either by use of a statute provid-
ing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or .
the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of
an extremely broad prohibitory statute."'
The interpretation given to "public policy" considerations in the
application of statutes providing for incorporation for "lawful" pur-
poses is central to the analysis of a potential equal protection issue.
The construction of "lawful" which was adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals in Freedom of Choice—that state public policy is
not violated by expressed purposes that are not unlawful" 4—would
not appear to pose equal protection problems. Under such a con-
struction of an incorporation statute, a public official cannot engage
in selective enforcement of the incorporation statute, determining
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not. He
has no broad discretionary power; if the purposes of a proposed
115
 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
111
 "[T]o withdraw the second-class rate from this publication today because its contents
seemed to one official not good for the public would sanction withdrawal of the second-class
rate tomorrow from another periodical whose social or economic views seemed harmful to
another official." Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 227 U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
112 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965) ("Also inherent in such a system
allowing parades or meetings only with the prior permission of an official is the obvious
danger to the right of a person or group not to be denied equal protection of the laws." Id.);
Niematko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
113 Cox, 379 U.S. at 557-58.
114 See text at note 22 supra.
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corporation are not contrary to the express laws of the state, he must
approve the articles of incorporation.
The construction of incorporation for "lawful" purposes
adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Grant' 1 S raises potentially
serious equal protection problems. The broad discretionary power
granted to the secretary of state invites him to engage in invidious
discrimination in determining which corporate purposes will be
permissible as not "against public policy" and encourages selective
application of the "extra-statutory" public policy restriction. Thus, it
is conceivable that while a corporation to promote the acceptance of
homosexuality as a valid life style would be found unacceptable, an
association for the promotion of patriotism would be permitted.
While reasonable persons may differ as to the relative merits of each
purpose, constitutional protections are afforded "without regard . .
to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered."" 6 Therefore, an incorporation statute which is
construed as vesting broad discretionary power in a state adminis-
trative official to determine whether a proposed corporation's pur-
poses are "lawful" in the sense of not being contrary to "extra-
statutory" determinations of public policy, increases the likelihood
of denial of equal protection and is contrary to the principle that
"[t]he right to equal protection of the laws . . . has a firmer
foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing
body,"'" or of a single administrative official.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that from a standpoint of both constitutional
substance and policy, a rule similar to that applied by the court in
Freedom of Choice should be adopted. It should be emphasized that
it is not suggested that states should exercise no control whatsoever
over incorporation or that the states have no valid interest in the
purposes of proposed corporations. It is not disputed that the impor-
tance and power of the corporate form also increases the potential
for abuse, and that a state is obligated to protect the general welfare
of its citizens. While the state has legitimate interests in the regula-
tion of incorporation, those interests are not jeopardized under an
approach whereby citizens may join together to achieve any pur-
poses which they may legally pursue as individuals—for any pur-
pose not contrary to the legislative and judicial pronouncements of
the law. Once the state approves an organization's articles of incor-
poration, it maintains substantial power over the activities of the
corporation" 8
 and can act when corporate abuses threaten the
"s See text at notes 14- 16 supra.
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 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963).
117
 Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272.
" 8 	How long and upon what terms a state-created corporation may continue to
exist is a matter exclusively of state power .
	
. There is nothing in the federal
836
PUBLIC POLICY AND "RIGHT" TO INCORPORATE
general welfare of its citizens.'" This power is sufficient to protect
the legitimate interests of the state and renders unnecessary the
broad discretionary power to deny incorporation for "extra-
statutory" public policy reasons. In addition, a system which per-
mits incorporation where the expressed purposes are not contrary to
the laws of the state will ensure that the valuable privilege of
incorporation will be granted in accordance with legislative intent
and commonly accepted equitable principles.
PAUL D. MOORE
Constitution which operates to restrain a state from terminating absolutely and
unconditionally the existence of a state-created corporation, if that be authorized by
the statute under which the corporation has been organized.
Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 127-28 (1937). For example, the Model
Business Corporation Act provides that a corporation may be dissolved by a court decree in
an action filed by the attorney general when it is proven either that the corporation procured
its articles through fraud or has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred on it by
the state. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 94(b)-(c) (1969). Furthermore, under the Model
Act the state retains the power to prescribe such regulations, provisions and limitations as the
legislature may deem advisable, such regulations, provisions and limitations being binding
upon all corporations subject to the Act, and the legislature also retains the power to amend,
repeal or modify the Act. Id. § 149.
l" Cf. Note, 55 Colum. L.J. 380 (1955), where the author suggests a system under
which "charters proper on their face would be filed automatically, subject of course to
revocation for illegal activities." Id. at 394.
837
